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Sparks are flying in the Strait of Gibraltar and not because 
of friction over tectonic plates. While business cooperation 
is thriving between Morocco and Spain political relations 
are not at their best. The authorities of both countries 
persistently say that their relationship is excellent and 
that the recurring spats are small disagreements that are 
simple to resolve. However, 
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s 
continue to occur, and 
everything indicates that 
it is not simply a matter of 
a love-hate relationship 
based on anthropological 
Mediterranean roots, but 
rather a more serious and 
structural problem.
In the last year, various 
events have occurred that 
illustrate the complex 
relations that exist between 
the two countries. The 
cases that have attracted 
the most attention include 
the irregular expulsion of 
Saharawi activist Aminatu 
Haidar by Moroccan 
authorities in late 2009 
while en route to the 
Canary Islands, which put 
the Spanish government 
in a highly embarrassing 
situation until Morocco reluctantly allowed her to 
return, or Rabat’s decision just a few months later, and 
bordering on provocation, to appoint a recent Saharawi 
deserter as new ambassador to Madrid. Moreover, in 
June the antenna of the Spanish Intelligence Service 
(CNI) was dismantled in the north of Morocco at the same 
moment that the Moroccan nationalist discourse focused 
on alleged residual Francoism in the Spanish army; in 
August incidents took place at the border with Melilla, with 
the passage of merchandise being blocked, supposedly 
by civil society out of protest against the ill-treatment 
of Moroccan citizens and 
Sub-Saharan migrants by 
the Spanish police; around 
the same time, Morocco 
protested because Spanish 
military helicopters flew over 
the monarch’s yacht while 
bringing provisions to the 
garrisons that were located 
on small rocks and islands 
along the North African coast; 
also in August, some Spanish 
pro-Saharawi activists in El 
Aaiún were first beaten up 
by Moroccan security forces 
dressed as civilians, then 
detained and expelled; in 
September, a visit to Melilla 
by Mariano Rajoy, the leader 
of the Spanish opposition 
party, was perceived as 
a highly provocative act, 
and citizens of Melilla 
and Ceuta were hindered 
by Moroccan authorities 
from undertaking sightseeing activities along 
the northern coast of Morocco. Taken together, these 
events have led to a disconcerting image of the supposedly 
“excellent relationship” between the two neighboring 
countries.
Despite the profound 
development gap that exists 
between Europe and the 
Maghreb, Spain desires 
to be as much of a solid 
economic anchor with its 
southern neighbors as it is 
with its immediate European 
neighbors. Trade with 
Morocco has intensified and is 
greater than that with Spain’s 
historic Latin-American 
partners, or than that with the 
more dynamic Asian powers.
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Are these misunderstandings unimportant, spontaneous 
and inevitable? There is no doubt that there could have been 
a lack of tact on both sides, and that non-governmental 
actors have intervened with their own agendas. As far as 
Morocco is concerned, the undemocratic political system 
means that some civil servants and politicians exceed in 
their nationalist and patriotic zeal and in their clumsiness 
generate conflicts that have consequences on the 
bilateral relationship as such. The Spanish government 
has decided not to create any controversy and instead 
to try to resolve these tensions discretely, with the least 
possible coverage in the media. The reasons that explain 
this approach include the fact that Morocco is a strategic 
partner and a solid ally, that the geographic proximity of 
the two countries implies a need for friendly relations, 
and that in sum Morocco is vital for Spanish interests. 
In fact, both governments insist, and based on the same 
formula, that they have shared economic, migration-
related and security interests.
It is obvious that Spain, despite the profound development 
gap that exists between Europe and the Maghreb, desires 
to be as much of a solid economic anchor with its southern 
neighbors as it is with its immediate European neighbors. 
In the last fifteen years, trade 
with Morocco has intensified 
and is currently greater than 
that with Spain’s historic 
Latin American partners, 
or than that with the more 
dynamic Asian powers. 
Trade with Morocco accounts 
for a modest 1.5% of Spain’s 
total foreign exchange, but 
apart from the hydrocarbon-
exporting countries Morocco 
is Spain’s leading Arab trade 
partner, with a trade balance 
in favor of Spain. Spanish 
investment in the country 
has grown, although it is still on a rather low level (0.6% 
of the FDI total in 2005-2009), which limits the transaction 
to a type of subcontracting, rather than a more productive 
integration. For Morocco as well, the north is key; Spain 
is its second most important commercial partner 
and its second biggest foreign investor. Spain actively 
participates in numerous modernization projects in 
Morocco, it has important interests in the fishing sector, 
and the two countries are linked through a unique 
electrical interconnection.
Madrid also wants to maintain and deepen cooperation 
in migration and security matters, such as anti-terrorist 
cooperation, and the fight against drug-trafficking – fields 
in which there have been substantial advances in recent 
years – and thus develop and intensify good relations with 
the country of origin of its largest group of non-European 
immigrants (in June 2010 around 760.000 Moroccans 
legally resided in Spain). And all that without negatively 
affecting its relations with Algeria, a key partner in the 
area of energy supply.
Also, Morocco is the first Arab recipient of Spanish 
development aid, and one of the few Arab countries 
that periodically maintain regular high-level ministerial 
meetings, the next of which will be held in Rabat at the 
beginning of 2011.
In addition to these elements, there is another factor 
related to domestic Spanish politics that underpins Spain’s 
relationship with Morocco. Madrid is determined to play 
an active role as the legitimizer of the Moroccan regime 
through symbolic goodwill gestures and by representing 
the Spanish-Moroccan relationship as a solid alliance. 
Two examples: since the days of the Spanish transition 
to democracy, it is an established tradition that the first 
foreign visit of the President of the Spanish government is 
to Rabat. More recently, Spain has become a permanent 
guarantor of Morocco in the European Union (EU) and 
in the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. 
Undoubtedly, one of the highlights of this patronage was 
the granting of EU Advanced Status to Morocco (2008) and 
the holding of the first EU-
Moroccan summit during 
the Spanish EU Presidency 
(Granada, March 7th, 2010). 
There is good reason to ask 
not only to what extent these 
gestures are justified – and 
are reciprocated by Rabat – 
but also what the political 
costs for Spain are in 
dealing with a partner that 
exhibits serious shortfalls 
in its democratic structure, 
and with whom there are 
both contentious issues 
and serious disputes.
Repeated incidents of more or less significance and 
transcendence point to the existence of more serious 
problems that are silenced by both sides, for the 
sake of business and security for Madrid, and in the 
name of stability and legitimization for Rabat. Without 
disregarding the existence of mutual ignorance, suspicion 
and distrust – or what some consider arrogance and lack 
of respect on the Spanish side (according to Hispanist 
and ex-ambassador Larbi Messari: “the relationship 
has to be decolonized”) – there are profound differences 
which neither side wants to make apparent, but that 
necessarily condition their relations. The four main 
issues are: the question of the Western Sahara (on 
which the Spanish people and the Spanish government 
diverge); the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla; competition 
with France and the interferences of Algeria; and the 
Madrid is determined to 
play an active role as the 
legitimizer of the Moroccan 
regime through symbolic 
goodwill gestures and through 
representing the Spanish-
Moroccan relationship as a 
solid alliance.
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profound distrust of Spanish actors towards the regime 
and the Moroccan political class.
The main aspect of the bilateral discord is definitely the 
Western Sahara question. The international community 
and the Spanish public opinion disagree with the 
ambiguous and contradictory Spanish government policy; 
officially Spain abides by international law, supports the 
right of self-determination of the ex-colony and backs up 
the United Nations’ efforts. However, at the same time 
it refrains from taking a leading role in the solution of 
the conflict, insists on supporting “a mutually-accepted 
solution” (which means that Spain  agrees with the 
Moroccan veto to a self-determination referendum) 
and considers the Moroccan proposal of autonomy 
positive. By doing this, Madrid has alienated itself from 
the Saharawis, but, 
in fact, this so-called 
“constructive neutrality” 
does not make sense 
any more. The growing 
distance from the 
American position on 
this issue that became 
increasingly apparent 
during the last few 
months, leaves Madrid 
uncomfortably alone 
with Paris in defending 
Rabat.
The enclaves of Ceuta, 
Melilla and several small 
rocks are territorial 
residues of a time when 
they had a profoundly 
different geo-strategic 
value. Although the 
United Nations do not 
consider them to be non-
self governing territories 
(colonies), they have 
become a permanent issue of Moroccan agitation, to the 
point that no Spanish head of government has visited 
these places for three decades (except for José Luiz 
Rodríguez Zapatero in 2006). The future of the two cities 
is uncertain and the current economic system that makes 
them the center of informal commerce and of smuggling 
in Northern Morocco is increasingly unsustainable. A new 
approach is therefore needed, taking into consideration 
the will of the inhabitants and the development of the 
whole region. This implies trans-border cooperation, 
yet, this is a prospect that clashes with the nationalist 
Moroccan rhetoric.
Moreover, there is a conflict of economic and geo-
strategic interests in which other parties, mainly France 
and Algeria, are involved, transforming these bilateral 
relations into a more complex affair of three and four 
participants. Rabat, which has bad relations with its 
Algerian neighbor, does not hesitate to use French 
support and protection. Owing to the French role, Spain 
cannot rely on the European Union in any serious dispute 
with Morocco, as became evident during the Perejil/
Parsley Island crisis (2002) when France prevented 
Brussels from taking a clear stand against Rabat, thus 
leaving it to Washington to intervene diplomatically. 
On the other hand, for economic and political reasons, 
Madrid has similar interests in maintaining a fluid 
understanding with Algeria.
Finally, it is noteworthy to point to the ballast of Moroccan 
politics that contaminates all economic, political and even 
civil society relations. There is widespread distrust among 
the Spanish political class 
and civil society about 
the Moroccan political 
system: political reforms 
that have been applied for 
almost two decades are 
seen as very limited and 
reformists have proven 
to be impotent vis-à-
vis the forces in power; 
the political transition is 
endless and the system 
has been disjointed, as the 
Royal Palace continues 
to interfere regularly; 
authoritarianism prevails, 
the human rights situation 
is not promising, and 
freedom of the press 
is violated. Eventually, 
these factors hinder the 
establishment of normal 
bilateral relations based 
on dialogue and trust. 
Ironically, crises are 
usually resolved through the Kings’ intervention, who, in 
an effort to reach out to the Moroccan public, tends to 
resort to drama-like demonstrations of goodwill, thereby 
emphasizing the close relations with Spain. This practice, 
however, confuses Spanish society to a great extent.
The illusion of Spanish-Moroccan relations, i.e. the 
determination of both sides to portray them as a 
“splendid relationship”, has prevented a public and 
transparent debate about the most serious questions 
and resulted in a foreign policy that is largely incoherent 
with the discourse that is usually maintained in other 
settings. It contributes to the perpetuation of tensions, 
deepens problems and gives protagonism to other non-
governmental actors. The crisis is contained, but it is 
neither resolved nor clarified. As a result confusion 
The illusion of Spanish-
Moroccan relations, i.e. the 
determination of both sides to 
portray them as a “splendid 
relationship”, has prevented 
a public and transparent 
debate about the most serious 
questions and resulted in a 
foreign policy that is largely 
incoherent with the discourse 
that is usually maintained in 
other settings.
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and distrust are reinforced, generating accumulated 
resentment.
On the Spanish side, with the exception of the business 
class, there is widespread public disagreement as 
regards the management of the bilateral relationship: 
the center-right asks for a firmer diplomacy in a rather 
nationalistic fashion, while civil society demands the 
upholding of democratic conditionality and mutual 
benefits. In addition, a large part of the population 
sympathizes with the demands for self-determination 
of the Saharawis. Curiously however, the major political 
forces simply ignore their neighbor in the South; proof of 
this is that the largest political parties barely maintain 
relationships with their Moroccan counterparts.
On the Moroccan side exists a panoply of positions. 
While society as such has gradually developed a new 
and more positive perception of its northern neighbor, 
any public initiative stems 
from the political parties and 
certain media outlets that 
continue to emphasize the 
old nationalist discourse and 
that indulge in the logic of 
inconclusive decolonization. 
The dissatisfaction of 
Moroccan nationalist forces 
with Spain dates back to 
the days of independence. 
In contrast to France, Spain 
withdrew gradually from the 
African territory over a period 
of twenty years, maintaining 
only Ceuta, Melilla and some 
tiny islands and rocks where 
the presence of military 
garrisons are still seen by 
Rabat as pending issues. The 
latter is used by Morocco to 
reproach Spain for making 
national unity difficult, and by extension for contributing 
to the backwardness and under-development of the 
country – these being issues which are not compensated 
for by the privileged treatment and the close collaboration 
that has emerged in other areas.
Despite that, the determination of the Spanish Socialist 
government has always been to limit conflicts and to 
defuse tensions by means of a diplomacy that can be 
described as “firm, but intelligent and sensible”. Rabat 
is perfectly aware that Madrid wishes to consolidate its 
relations, as it has very important economic interests 
and needs effective cooperation on matters of security in 
the south of the Mediterranean. As Spain, for the reasons 
mentioned above, cannot rely on the EU in resolving 
bilateral disputes with Morocco, the latter, in exchange 
for cooperation on security and economic matters, 
demands Spanish backing of the regime, understood as 
a maintenance and acceptance of the status quo. In turn, 
this means explicit support of the Moroccan position 
on the question of the Western Sahara, support of the 
proposal for autonomy and thus a de facto abolition of 
Spain’s “constructive neutrality” approach towards its 
“ex-colony”. In view of this order of priorities, Ceuta and 
Melilla do lose some of their importance as contentious 
issues and barely serve as a pretext for nationalists on 
both sides to react instantly to potential offences to their 
respective nations.
In some ways the bilateral relationship is based on the 
logic of a veiled threat on the Moroccan side and of explicit 
interests on the Spanish side. Morocco does not hide the 
fact that an eventual destabilization would endanger the 
position of Spanish businesses in the Moroccan market, 
and would create security problems for Europe and, more 
importantly, for Spain itself. By 
accepting the political status 
quo in Morocco and by having 
decided to engage itself in 
the country’s modernization 
process, Madrid has fully 
accepted this discourse and 
simply focuses on security 
and economic cooperation; 
although this position implies 
that it has to put up with 
continuous incidents and 
embarrassing situations, act in 
contradiction to international 
law as far as the Western 
Sahara is concerned, provide 
a non-democratic regime with 
favorable deals, and turn a 
blind eye to the perpetuation 
of authoritarian practices.
The nature of the Moroccan 
regime also contributes to the 
fact that numerous issues are not being debated openly 
and that a meaningful involvement of the political and 
social organizations of the two countries is systematically 
prevented. The result is a serious lack of transparency 
that adds to confusion and to the deterioration of mutual 
perceptions. It is hence unsurprising that otherwise 
meaningless episodes of misunderstanding become 
suddenly important and place the two partners in 
extremely uncomfortable situations, which all too 
often have domestic political implications as far as 
Spain is concerned and which repeatedly highlights the 
obsolescence of this particular relationship model.
In various African countries like Morocco, Tunisia 
and Equatorial Guinea, the political coherence of 
Spanish foreign policy is seriously in doubt. Spain 
has characterized itself to be at the heart of the EU 
Spanish-Moroccan 
relations exemplify 
impressively that in an 
inter-dependent world, 
good neighborly relations 
cannot be based on tricks 
and ruses, demands for 
unconditional support, 
mere economic interest or 
the desire to externalize 
security tasks.
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– to the surprise of many – as being one of the least 
demanding governments with respect to attempts to 
condition cooperation and privileged deals and link 
them to advances in democratization. Madrid has given 
preeminence to security and to the interest of economic 
groups in its foreign policy, and in so doing it has seriously 
put in doubt other clearly progressive and daring 
initiatives in matters of multilateralism, the Alliance of 
Civilizations and of human development on a global level.
Spanish-Moroccan relations exemplify impressively 
that in an inter-dependent world, good neighborly 
relations cannot be based on tricks and ruses, demands 
for unconditional support, mere economic interest or 
the desire to externalize security tasks. Today, more 
than ever, dialogue is a necessary step towards the 
expression of mutual demands, the respect for the right 
to development for all, and upholding international law.
